Available from Cornell University Press (30% discount code: 09BCARD) and Amazon, in hardcover and e-book
Sneak peek available here
Praise for the book:
"This richly researched book explains US decisions to exert allied burden-sharing pressure and when allies will actually comply with such pressure. Those interested in alliance politics, the political economy of security, and US foreign policy will find much to learn here."
-- Paul Poast, University of Chicago
"In this persuasive and much-needed book, Brian D. Blankenship highlights and explains the variation in whether the United States brings burden-sharing pressure to bear on its allies and the extent to which those efforts succeed. The Burden-Sharing Dilemma is indispensable for understanding military alliances and American foreign policy."
--Alexander Lanoszka, University of Waterloo
"An insightful study of the conditions under which US leaders seek increased support from allies and how allies respond. By focusing on bargaining among allies over time, Blankenship helps us to understand the strengths and limits of the current US-led security order."
-- Brett Ashley Leeds, Rice University
"Blankenship skillfully illustrates the dilemma that the United States faces in its pursuit of military burden-sharing with allies. By illuminating the tradeoff between control and cost-sharing, this book provides an important strategic perspective on debates over burden-sharing and broader alliance politics."
-- Tongfi Kim, Brussels School of Governance
The Burden-Sharing Dilemma: Coercive Diplomacy in US Alliance Politics
Published in the Cornell University Press Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series
From the publisher:
The Burden-Sharing Dilemma examines the conditions under which the United States is willing and able to pressure its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense. The United States has a mixed track record of encouraging allied burden-sharing—while it has succeeded or failed in some cases, it has declined to do so at all in others. This variation, Brian D. Blankenship argues, is because the United States tailors its burden-sharing pressure in accordance with two competing priorities: conserving its own resources and preserving influence in its alliances. Although burden-sharing enables great power patrons like the United States to lower alliance costs, it also empowers allies to resist patron influence.
Blankenship identifies three factors that determine the severity of this burden-sharing dilemma and how it is managed: the latent military power of allies, the shared external threat environment, and the level of a patron's resource constraints. Through case studies of US alliances formed during the Cold War, he shows that a patron can mitigate the dilemma by combining assurances of protection with threats of abandonment and by exercising discretion in its burden-sharing pressure.
Blankenship's findings dismantle assumptions that burden-sharing is always desirable but difficult to obtain. Patrons, as the book reveals, can in fact be reluctant to seek burden-sharing, and attempts to pass defense costs to allies can often be successful. At a time when skepticism of alliance benefits remains high and global power shifts threaten longstanding pacts, The Burden-Sharing Dilemma recalls and reconceives the value of burden-sharing and alliances.