

International Cooperation

Instructor: Brian Blankenship

Course Location: TBA

Course Meeting Time: TBA

Office Hours: TBA

Course Description

This course is designed to familiarize students with the causes, functions, and consequences of cooperation in international relations. States often need to cooperate in order to advance their individual and collective self-interests. Nevertheless, they face barriers to cooperation including incompatible interests, fears of cheating, and concerns about relative gains. Centrally, the course will explore the question of how and to what extent – despite some incongruent and perhaps directly conflicting interests – states are able to pursue common goals under anarchy, even in the “high politics” realm of security policy.

All of the readings are posted online. There are no books to buy.

Learning Objectives

In addition to substantive knowledge, students can expect to develop the following skills over the duration of the course:

- Students will come to a critical understanding of competing theories and debates on the formation and functions of alliances in international relations, and will become more familiar with the challenges of security cooperation in world politics.
- Students will improve their persuasive and analytical writing skills.
- Students will learn how to dissect, restate, and critique theoretical and empirical arguments in scholarly political science work.
- Students will learn to build upon existing research to develop and test their own arguments.

Requirements

Late work will lose 10% of possible points per day.

Attendance and Participation: 20 %

Attendance and weekly readings are mandatory, and students should come prepared with discussion points and questions based on the week's materials. Class may not be missed except in case of exceptional emergency, religious observance, or illness with a doctor's note, and I must be informed as far ahead of time as practicable. Absences harm not only the participation grade, but affect grading of all other work as I am less able to assess the student's understanding of and engagement with the relevant texts. Make-up work may be assigned for approved absences.

Research Paper: 40 %

The major assignment for the course is an original research paper. Ideally, the paper should serve as the basis for published work. In Week 5, students will be asked to submit a two-page memo in which they propose a topic, with a research question and notional hypotheses. Then in Week 8, students will submit an additional five-page memo in which they finalize their research question and hypotheses and roughly lay out the details of the research design and analysis.

Memos: 10 % each (total: 20 %)**Response Paper: 20 %**

Students will be required to submit a four-page paper, worth 20 % of the final grade, in response to a week's readings. These response papers should discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the readings, raise questions for further analysis or clarification, and more generally discuss how one or more readings connect to themes in the course and contribute to our understanding of the functions and effects of security cooperation in international politics.

Course Schedule

1 Introduction: Why Cooperate?

Section 1. Cooperation in International Politics

Central Questions:

- Why do states cooperate—or not cooperate?
- When is cooperation easier or more difficult?
- What forms can cooperation take?

Required:

Oye, Kenneth. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy." *World Politics* 38 (1): 1-24.

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (2): 167-214.

Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses." *World Politics* 44: 466-96.

Jervis, Robert. 1999. "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security* 24 (1): 42-63.

Further Reading:

Milner, Helen V. 1991. "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Politics: A Critique." *Review of International Studies* 17 (1): 67-85.

Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. : Harper Collins: Basic Books.

Fearon, James D. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation." *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.

2 International Institutions and International Law

Section 2. Do International Institutions Promote Cooperation?

Central Questions:

- How do international institutions reduce the barriers to cooperation?

Required:

Axelrod, Robert, and Kenneth Oye. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38 (1): 226-254.

Chapters 1-3 and 7 of Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert. 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* 110: 82-96.

Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.

Simmons, Beth, and Lisa Martin. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52 (4): 729-757.

Further Reading:

Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin. 2003. "Institutional Theory as a Research Program." In *Progress in International Relations theory: Appraising the field.*, Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman, eds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 71-108.

Davis, Christina L. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 153-169.

Section 3. Critiques of International Institutions**Central Questions:**

- Why might international institutions be ineffective?
- (When) Is compliance with international law evidence for international law's effectiveness?

Required:

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.

Keohane, Robert, and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20 (1): 39-51.

Downs, George W., David M. Roake, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3): 376-406.

Von Stein, Jana. 2005. "Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance." *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 611-22.

Simmons, Beth A., and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theory and Methods." *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 623-31.

Further Reading:

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55 (4): 761-99.

Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1993. "On Compliance." *International Organization* 47 (2): 175-205.

3 Cooperation and International Security

Section 4. Why Do States Join Military Alliances?

MEMO DUE

Central Questions:

- What functions do alliances serve?
- What are the risks and benefits of joining an alliance?
- When might a state choose to enhance its security by joining an alliance instead of through other means?

Required:

Chapter 6 of Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Chapters 1-2 of Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Chapters 1-3 of Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, Michael N. 1996. "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East." In *The Culture of National Security*, edited by Peter Katzenstein, 400-447. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chapter 1 of Haas, Mark L. 2005. *The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Further Reading:

Schweller, Randall L. 1994. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." *International Security* 19 (1): 72-107.

Schroeder, Paul. 1994. "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory." *International Security* 19 (1): 108-48.

Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, and William L. Brenner. 2007. "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History." *European Journal of International Relations* 13 (2): 155-85.

Barnett, Michael N., and Jack S. Levy. 1991. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73." *International Organization* 45 (3): 369-95.

Narizny, Kevin. 2007. *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (4): 904-33.

Lake, David A. 2009. *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Section 5. Alliance Cohesion and Durability

Central Questions:

- When and why do alliances fall apart?
- When do states violate their alliance commitments?

Required:

Chapters 1-2 of Weitsman, Patricia A. 2004. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Chapter 6 of Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 775-95.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2):

461-76.

Crawford, Timothy W. 2011. "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics." *International Security* 35 (4): 155-89.

Further Reading:

Kim, Tongfi. 2016. *The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Schroeder, Paul W. 1976. "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management." In *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*, edited by Klaus Knorr, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 247-86.

Pressman, Jeremy. 2008. *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Cha, Victor D. 2009. "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia." *International Security* 34 (3): 158-96.

Gelpi, Christopher. 1999. "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control." In *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O Keohane, and Celeste A Wallander. New York: Clarendon Press, 107-39.

Bearce, David H., Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros. 2006. "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States." *International Organization* 60 (3): 595-625.

Owsiak, Andrew P., and Derrick V. Frazier. 2014. "The Conflict Management Efforts of Allies in Interstate Disputes." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (3): 243-64.

Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds. 2014. "To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances." *International Organization* 68 (4): 775-809.

Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3): 846-78.

Section 6. Do Alliances Prevent (or Cause) War?

Central Questions:

- Do alliances cause peace or war?
- What makes alliances commitments credible?

Required:

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (2): 270-97.

Miller, Gregory D. 2003. "Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past." *Security Studies* 12 (3): 40-78.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3): 427-39.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2000. "Alliances: Why Some Cause War and Why Others Cause Peace." In *What Do We Know about War?*, edited by John A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 145-64.

Further Reading:

Press, Daryl G. 2005. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Benson, Brett V. 2011. "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816-2000." *Journal of Politics* 73 (4): 1111-27.

Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Todd S. Sechser. 2014. "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 919-35.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Sezi Anac. 2005. "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance." *International Interactions* 31 (3): 183-202.

Chapters 1-2 of Mercer, Jonathan. 1996. *Reputation and International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Press, Daryl G. 2005. *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Benson, Brett V. 2011. "Unpacking Alliances: Deterrent and Compellent Alliances and Their Relationship with Conflict, 1816-2000." *Journal of Politics* 73 (4): 1111-27.

Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Todd S. Sechser. 2014. "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science* 58 (4): 919-35.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, and Sezi Anac. 2005. "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance." *International Interactions* 31 (3): 183-202.

Section 7. International Institutions and Collective Security

MEMO DUE

Central Questions:

- Can international institutions keep peace?
- What is the difference between collective security and an alliance?

Required:

Hudson, G.F. 1968. "Collective Security and Military Alliances," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huth, Paul. K., et al. 2011. "Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 415-436

Chapter 5 of Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Betts, Richard. 1994. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73 (6): 20-33.

Voeten, Erik. 2001. "Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action." *American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 845-858.

Further Reading:

Hathaway, Oona A., and Scott J. Shapiro. 2017. *The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Section 8. Arms Control and Arms Races

MEMO DUE

Central Questions:

- Why and when do states engage in arms races?
- What makes for effective arms control agreements?

Required:

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1985. "Arms Races and Cooperation." *World Politics* 38 (1): 118-146.

Fairbanks, Charles H. Jr., and Abram N. Shulsky. 1987. "Arms Control: The Historical Experience." *The Washington Quarterly* 10 (3): 59-75.

Kydd, Andrew. 2000. "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 228-244.

Kreps, Sarah E. 2018. "The Institutional Design of Arms Control Agreements." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14 (1): 127-147.

Rider, Toby J. 2009. "Understanding Arms Race Onset: Rivalry, Threat, and Territorial Competition." *Journal of Politics* 71 (2): 693-703.

Further Reading:

Kydd, Andrew. 2005. *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1958. "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results." *Public Policy* 8: 41-86.

Senghaas, Dieter. 1990. "Arms Race Dynamics and Arms Control." In *Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics*, ed. Nils P. Gleditsch and Olav Njolstad, 15-30. Oslo: Sage.

4 Cooperation and the International Economy

Section 9. International Trade and Finance

Central Questions:

- Why do states trade?
- What is the role of international institutions in promoting economic interdependence?

Required:

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61 (1): 37-67.

Grieco, Joseph. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42 (3): 485-507.

Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Dispute Resolution Mechanism at the WTO." *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 389-400.

Woods, Ngaire. 2006. *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, ("The Mission in Mexico") pp. 84-103, and ("Mission Unaccomplished in Africa") pp. 141-178.

Further Reading:

Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert W. Staiger. 2010. "The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice." *Annual Review of Economics* 2 (1): 223-56.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2007. "Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation." *Journal of Politics* 69 (3): 746-59.

Posner, Elliot. 2009. "Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium." *International Organization* 63 (4): 665-99.

Section 10. Interdependence and Influence

Central Questions:

- What is the relationship between interdependence and influence?
- (When) Can interdependence be used as a weapon?

Required:

Chapter 7 of Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Chapters 1-2 and 7 of Papayoanou, Paul A. 1999. *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Frieden, Jeff. 1988. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940." *International Organization* 42 (1): 59-90.

Flores-Macias, Gustavo, and Sarah Kreps. 2013. "The Foreign Policy Consequences of China's Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America." *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 357-371.

Further Reading:

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Baldwin, David. 1985. *Economic Statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Section 11. The Effects of Interdependence

Central Questions:

- Does economic interdependence cause peace?
- What are the effect of globalization on growth, inequality, and the environment?

Required:

Chapters 2-3 of Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *Rise of the Trading State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 1 of Copeland, Dale. 2014. *Economic Interdependence and War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frankel, Jeffrey. 2000. "Globalization of the Economy." in *Governance in a Globalizing World, Visions of Governance Project*, edited by Joseph Nye and John Donahue. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 45-70.

Section 12. Hegemonic Stability Theory

Central Questions:

- Does international cooperation function most effectively in the presence of a dominant state?

Required:

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1981. "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy." *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (2): 242-254.

Chapters 1-4 of Norrlof, Carla. 2010. *America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." *International Organization* 39 (4): 579-614.

Further Reading:

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Brooks, Stephen G., G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth. 2012. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." *International Security* 37 (3): 7-51.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2013. "Military Primacy Doesn't Pay (Nearly As Much As You Think)." *International Security* 38 (1): 52-79.

McKeown, Timothy. 1983. "Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe." *International Organization* 37 (1): 73-92.

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

5 Emerging Issues

Section 13. Conclusion

Required:

Victor, David G. 2006. "International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests, and Institutions." *Global Environmental Politics* 6 (3): 90-103.

Barrett, Scott. 1997. "The Strategy of Trade Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements." *Resource and Energy Economics* 19 (4): 345-361.

Chapters 1-2 of Drezner, Daniel. 2014. *The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Barany, Zoltan, and Robert Rauchhaus. 2011. "Explaining NATO's Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 32 (2): 286-307.

Further Reading:

Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. *Theory of Unipolar Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. 2009. "Alliances in a Unipolar World." *World Politics* 61 (1): 86-120.

Kreps, Sarah E. 2011. *Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. "The Tragedy of the Commons." *Science* 162 (3859): 1243-48.

Bechtel, Michael M., and Jale Tosun. 2009. "Changing Economic Openness for Policy Convergence: When Can Trade Agreements Induce Convergence of Environmental Regulation?" *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (4): 931-953.

Urpelainen, Johannes, and Thijs van de Graaf. 2018. "United States Non-Cooperation and the Paris Agreement." *Climate Policy* 18 (7): 839-851.