

International Cooperation

Instructor: Brian Blankenship

Course Location: TBA

Course Meeting Time: TBA

Office Hours: TBA

Course Description

This course is designed to familiarize students with the causes, functions, and consequences of cooperation in international relations. States often need to cooperate in order to advance their individual and collective self-interests. Nevertheless, they face barriers to cooperation including incompatible interests, fears of cheating, and concerns about relative gains. Centrally, the course will explore the question of how and to what extent – despite some incongruent and perhaps directly conflicting interests – states are able to pursue common goals under anarchy, even in the “high politics” realm of security policy.

All of the readings are posted online. There are no books to buy.

Learning Objectives

In addition to substantive knowledge, students can expect to develop the following skills over the duration of the course:

- Students will come to a critical understanding of competing theories and debates on the causes of cooperation in international relations, and will become more familiar with the challenges of cooperation in world politics.
- Students will improve their persuasive and analytical writing skills.
- Students will learn how to dissect, restate, and critique theoretical and empirical arguments in scholarly political science work.

Requirements

Late work will lose 10% of possible points per day.

Attendance and Participation: 20%

Attendance and weekly readings are mandatory, and students should come prepared with discussion points and questions based on the week's materials. Class may not be missed except in case of exceptional emergency, religious observance, or illness with a doctor's note, and I must be informed as far ahead of time as practicable. Absences harm not only the participation grade, but affect grading of all other work as I am less able to assess the student's understanding of and engagement with the relevant texts. Make-up work may be assigned for approved absences.

Quizzes: 10%

Students will be asked to take two short quizzes that ask them to recall central points from the week's readings.

Response Paper: 20%

Students will be required to submit a two-page paper, worth 20 % of the final grade, in response to a week's readings. These papers should discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the readings, raise questions for further analysis or clarification, and more generally discuss how one or more readings connect to themes in the course and contribute to our understanding of the functions and effects of cooperation in international politics.

Midterm Exam: 20%**Final Exam: 30%**

Course Schedule

1 Introduction: Why Cooperate?

Section 1. Cooperation in International Politics

Central Questions:

- Why do states cooperate—or not cooperate?
- When is cooperation easier or more difficult?
- What forms can cooperation take?

Required:

Oye, Kenneth. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy." *World Politics* 38 (1): 1-24.

Jervis, Robert. 1999. "Realism, Neoliberalism and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate." *International Security* 24 (1): 42-63.

Section 2. Self-Help and Cooperation

Central Questions:

- How do the risks and benefits of cooperation compare with those of self-sufficiency?
- How do states balance their needs for self-help and cooperation?

Required:

Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (2): 167-214.

Milner, Helen. 1992. "International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses." *World Politics* 44: 466-96.

2 International Institutions and International Law

Section 3. Do International Institutions Promote Cooperation?

Central Questions:

- How do international institutions reduce the barriers to cooperation?

Required:

Axelrod, Robert, and Kenneth Oye. 1985. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions." *World Politics* 38 (1): 226-254.

Keohane, Robert. 1998. "International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?" *Foreign Policy* 110: 82-96.

Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1): 3-32.

Simmons, Beth, and Lisa Martin. 1998. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52 (4): 729-757.

Section 4. Critiques of International Institutions

Central Questions:

- Why might international institutions be ineffective?
- (When) Is compliance with international law evidence for international law's effectiveness?

Mearsheimer, John. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19 (3): 5-49.

Keohane, Robert, and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20 (1): 39-51.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom. 1996. "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?" *International Organization* 50 (3): 376-406.

3 Cooperation and International Security

Section 5. Why Do States Join Military Alliances?

Central Questions:

- What functions do alliances serve?
- What are the risks and benefits of joining an alliance?
- When might a state choose to enhance its security by joining an alliance instead of through other means?

Required:

Chapter 6 of Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Chapter 2 of Walt, Stephen M. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36 (4): 461-95.

Section 6. Alliance Cohesion and Durability**Central Questions:**

- When and why do alliances fall apart?
- When do states violate their alliance commitments?

Required:

Chapters 1-2 of Weitsman, Patricia A. 2004. *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gartzke, Erik, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (4): 775-95.

Leeds, Brett Ashley, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 461-76.

Crawford, Timothy W. 2011. "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics." *International Security* 35 (4): 155-89.

Section 7. Do Alliances Prevent War?**Central Questions:**

- Do alliances cause peace or war?
- What makes alliances commitments credible?

Required:

Morrow, James D. 1994. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38 (2): 270-97.

Miller, Gregory D. 2003. "Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past." *Security Studies* 12 (3): 40-78.

Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3): 427-39.

Section 8. International Institutions and Collective Security

Central Questions:

- Can international institutions keep peace?
- What is the difference between collective security and an alliance?

Required:

Hudson, G.F. 1968. "Collective Security and Military Alliances," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Huth, Paul. K., et al. 2011. "Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945." *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 415-436

Chapter 5 of Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. *Does Peacekeeping Work?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Betts, Richard. 1994. "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention." *Foreign Affairs* 73 (6): 20-33.

4 Cooperation and the International Economy

Section 9. International Trade and Finance

Central Questions:

- Why do states trade?
- What is the role of international institutions in promoting economic interdependence?

Required:

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61 (1): 37-67.

Grieco, Joseph. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42 (3): 485-507.

Woods, Ngaire. 2006. *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, ("The Mission in Mexico") pp. 84-103, and ("Mission Unaccomplished in Africa") pp. 141-178.

Section 10. Interdependence and Influence

Central Questions:

- What is the relationship between interdependence and influence?
- (When) Can interdependence be used as a weapon?

Required:

Chapter 7 of Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Frieden, Jeff. 1988. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940." *International Organization* 42 (1): 59-90.

Flores-Macias, Gustavo, and Sarah Kreps. 2013. "The Foreign Policy Consequences of China's Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America." *Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 357-371.

Section 11. The Effects of Interdependence

Central Questions:

- Does economic interdependence cause peace?
- What are the effect of globalization on growth, inequality, and the environment?

Required:

Chapters 2-3 of Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. *Rise of the Trading State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 1 of Copeland, Dale. 2014. *Economic Interdependence and War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Frankel, Jeffrey. 2000. "Globalization of the Economy." in *Governance in a Globalizing World, Visions of Governance Project*, edited by Joseph Nye and John Donahue. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 45-70.

Section 12. Hegemonic Stability Theory

Central Questions:

- Does international cooperation function most effectively in the presence of a dominant state?

Required:

Chapters 2-3 of Norrlof, Carla. 2010. *America's Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory." *International Organization* 39 (4): 579-614.

5 Current Issues

Section 13. Conclusion

Required:

Victor, David G. 2006. "International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests, and Institutions." *Global Environmental Politics* 6 (3): 90-103.

Chapters 1-2 of Drezner, Daniel. 2014. *The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lissner, Rebecca Friedman, and Mira Rapp-Hooper. 2018. "The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order." *Washington Quarterly* 41: 7-25.