Publications and Works in Progress
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"Promises under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in U.S. Alliances." International Studies Quarterly, 64 (4): 1017-1030 (2020).
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany from 1961-1974. The findings have implications for understanding how states manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah Miles Joyce] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (2): 545-573 (2020). Ungated version
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide economic benefits for strategic ends. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new data set of US government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. We illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code US military access in Africa, assess the relationship between spending and economic growth, and test whether economic inducements can buy influence.
"Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?" [With Benjamin Denison.] Survival 64 (5): 43-64.
Abstract: Using the framework of internal and external balancing, we assess the ability of the U.S. to pivot to great power competition with China and Russia. Based on current policy and long-term structural trends, we argue that the United States will be hard-pressed to find success in its efforts at great power competition. Specifically, we argue that fiscal trends in the United States have made it difficult for Washington to invest in sources of national power that would be facilitate efforts toward great power competition. Moreover, the Trump administration’s coercive approach to alliance burden-sharing is only likely to encourage U.S. allies to either go their own way or to hedge by accommodating Russia or China. Ultimately, we make the case that the United States would be well-served by either taking the politically difficult steps to overcome these constraints, or by moderating its grand strategy.
"When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 381-409 (2018).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"How Do Sectoral Interests Shape Distributive Politics? Evidence from Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies." [With Johannes Urpelainen.] Review of Policy Research 36 (4): 420-447 (2019)
Abstract: Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991-2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline-diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany from 1961-1974. The findings have implications for understanding how states manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah Miles Joyce] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (2): 545-573 (2020). Ungated version
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide economic benefits for strategic ends. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new data set of US government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. We illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code US military access in Africa, assess the relationship between spending and economic growth, and test whether economic inducements can buy influence.
"Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?" [With Benjamin Denison.] Survival 64 (5): 43-64.
Abstract: Using the framework of internal and external balancing, we assess the ability of the U.S. to pivot to great power competition with China and Russia. Based on current policy and long-term structural trends, we argue that the United States will be hard-pressed to find success in its efforts at great power competition. Specifically, we argue that fiscal trends in the United States have made it difficult for Washington to invest in sources of national power that would be facilitate efforts toward great power competition. Moreover, the Trump administration’s coercive approach to alliance burden-sharing is only likely to encourage U.S. allies to either go their own way or to hedge by accommodating Russia or China. Ultimately, we make the case that the United States would be well-served by either taking the politically difficult steps to overcome these constraints, or by moderating its grand strategy.
"When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 381-409 (2018).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"How Do Sectoral Interests Shape Distributive Politics? Evidence from Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies." [With Johannes Urpelainen.] Review of Policy Research 36 (4): 420-447 (2019)
Abstract: Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991-2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline-diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Works in Progress
"Market for Access: Competition, Need, and the Prospects for Power Projection," [With Renanah Miles.]
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which great powers exert influence in international politics. Yet variation in the costs of securing military access--a requisite for power projection--remains understudied. We argue that bargaining outcomes are shaped by a market for access in which price is determined by supply and demand. Hosts, or ``sellers,'' extract higher compensation for access when there are multiple potential ``buyers,'' or when the sending state has a high need for access. By contrast, when there are many potential sellers or the seller has greater need for a deal, the buying state can secure more advantageous terms. We test these propositions by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on U.S. governmental spending and access in Africa from 2000 to 2015. To trace the causal mechanisms, we conduct a case study of great power bargaining for access in Djibouti during the same period. Our findings have implications for scholarly understanding of how other powers can impose costs on dominant states. We find that third-party competitors can pose problems by simply acting as alternative suppliers of desired goods to states in contested areas--even in a unipolar era where the United States is the sole superpower.
"The Price of Protection: Success and Failure in Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing."
Abstract: Existing scholarship on alliance burden-sharing focuses on explaining why smaller allies often under-contribute relative to their larger partners. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by coercive bargaining in shaping burden-sharing outcomes. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding, allies’ defense efforts are often a response to their patron’s threat of abandonment. When the patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to elicit burden-sharing. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in U.S. alliances from 1950-2010. The results show that allies increase their burden-sharing efforts when the United States faces resource constraints that brings its commitment into question, and that allies which are geographically vulnerable to attack contribute more for burden-sharing while allies which are in geostrategically valuable locations to the United States contribute less. I further illustrate the theory’s causal mechanisms using qualitative evidence from burden-sharing in the U.S. alliances with South Korea and the United Kingdom.
"Rethinking Reassurance: The Importance of Military Capabilities in Credibly Assuring Allies." [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Despite massive investments to assure allies of Washington’s willingness and ability to defend them, the effectiveness of reassurance measures is uncertain and the determinants of effective reassurance have received little academic attention. The limited existing research on the topic focuses on the role of resolve in making security assurances credible, sidelining important questions about the role of capability. We argue that capability is just as important. This is particularly true in an era where leaders may be less willing to put troops in harm’s way, where conventional forces play a central role in deterrence and reassurance, and where new military technologies that reduce risk to friendly forces allow a patron state to project power and capability without signaling much resolve. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on variation in military capability and resolve, and test them using data from an original survey fielded on European foreign policy elite and a case study of U.S. and NATO reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that capabilities often matter as much as resolve in reassuring allies, with relatively limited deployments of high-tech capabilities reassuring allies just as much as tripwire forces.
"Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?" [With Raymond Kuo.],
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim this view applies only to JMEs conducted outside an alliance. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership's overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003.
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which great powers exert influence in international politics. Yet variation in the costs of securing military access--a requisite for power projection--remains understudied. We argue that bargaining outcomes are shaped by a market for access in which price is determined by supply and demand. Hosts, or ``sellers,'' extract higher compensation for access when there are multiple potential ``buyers,'' or when the sending state has a high need for access. By contrast, when there are many potential sellers or the seller has greater need for a deal, the buying state can secure more advantageous terms. We test these propositions by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on U.S. governmental spending and access in Africa from 2000 to 2015. To trace the causal mechanisms, we conduct a case study of great power bargaining for access in Djibouti during the same period. Our findings have implications for scholarly understanding of how other powers can impose costs on dominant states. We find that third-party competitors can pose problems by simply acting as alternative suppliers of desired goods to states in contested areas--even in a unipolar era where the United States is the sole superpower.
"The Price of Protection: Success and Failure in Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing."
Abstract: Existing scholarship on alliance burden-sharing focuses on explaining why smaller allies often under-contribute relative to their larger partners. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by coercive bargaining in shaping burden-sharing outcomes. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding, allies’ defense efforts are often a response to their patron’s threat of abandonment. When the patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to elicit burden-sharing. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in U.S. alliances from 1950-2010. The results show that allies increase their burden-sharing efforts when the United States faces resource constraints that brings its commitment into question, and that allies which are geographically vulnerable to attack contribute more for burden-sharing while allies which are in geostrategically valuable locations to the United States contribute less. I further illustrate the theory’s causal mechanisms using qualitative evidence from burden-sharing in the U.S. alliances with South Korea and the United Kingdom.
"Rethinking Reassurance: The Importance of Military Capabilities in Credibly Assuring Allies." [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Despite massive investments to assure allies of Washington’s willingness and ability to defend them, the effectiveness of reassurance measures is uncertain and the determinants of effective reassurance have received little academic attention. The limited existing research on the topic focuses on the role of resolve in making security assurances credible, sidelining important questions about the role of capability. We argue that capability is just as important. This is particularly true in an era where leaders may be less willing to put troops in harm’s way, where conventional forces play a central role in deterrence and reassurance, and where new military technologies that reduce risk to friendly forces allow a patron state to project power and capability without signaling much resolve. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on variation in military capability and resolve, and test them using data from an original survey fielded on European foreign policy elite and a case study of U.S. and NATO reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that capabilities often matter as much as resolve in reassuring allies, with relatively limited deployments of high-tech capabilities reassuring allies just as much as tripwire forces.
"Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?" [With Raymond Kuo.],
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim this view applies only to JMEs conducted outside an alliance. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership's overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003.
Other Publications
"Does the Pentagon's Checkbook Diplomacy Actually Work?" Defense One, June 23, 2020. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
"'Money as a Weapons System': The Promises and Pitfalls of Foreign Defense Contracting." Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 892, June 3, 2020. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
"Rethinking Reassurance." Political Violence at a Glance, November 13, 2018. [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
"Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO." War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare Blog, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
Review of The Supply Side of Security by Tongfi Kim, Political Science Quarterly 132 (2): 360–361 (Summer 2017).
Review of Theory of Unipolar Politics by Nuno Monteiro, Political Science Quarterly 130 (1): 157-158 (Spring 2015).
"'Money as a Weapons System': The Promises and Pitfalls of Foreign Defense Contracting." Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 892, June 3, 2020. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
"Rethinking Reassurance." Political Violence at a Glance, November 13, 2018. [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
"Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO." War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare Blog, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Miles Joyce.]
Review of The Supply Side of Security by Tongfi Kim, Political Science Quarterly 132 (2): 360–361 (Summer 2017).
Review of Theory of Unipolar Politics by Nuno Monteiro, Political Science Quarterly 130 (1): 157-158 (Spring 2015).