Selected Publications and Works in Progress
Peer-Reviewed Book
The Burden-Sharing Dilemma: Coercive Diplomacy in US Alliance Politics. Cornell University Press, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series, November 15, 2023.
Defense burden-sharing is central to the functioning of military alliances. This book explores the conditions under which the United States encourages its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense as well as the conditions under which these efforts succeed or fail. It argues that the United States tailors its attempts to encourage allied burden-sharing in recognition of the trade-off between control and cost-sharing. While more allied contributions allow the United States to reduce its own burdens, they also empower those allies to go their own way. Thus, the United States is strategic with its burden-sharing, seeking burden-sharing when the risk of losing control over allies is lower and strains on U.S. resources are higher. When the United States does seek additional burden-sharing from allies, its success depends on the salience of its threat to abandon those allies. The book illustrates the argument using four case studies drawn from U.S. alliances during the Cold War: West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Iceland.
Praise for the book
Defense burden-sharing is central to the functioning of military alliances. This book explores the conditions under which the United States encourages its allies to assume more responsibility for their own defense as well as the conditions under which these efforts succeed or fail. It argues that the United States tailors its attempts to encourage allied burden-sharing in recognition of the trade-off between control and cost-sharing. While more allied contributions allow the United States to reduce its own burdens, they also empower those allies to go their own way. Thus, the United States is strategic with its burden-sharing, seeking burden-sharing when the risk of losing control over allies is lower and strains on U.S. resources are higher. When the United States does seek additional burden-sharing from allies, its success depends on the salience of its threat to abandon those allies. The book illustrates the argument using four case studies drawn from U.S. alliances during the Cold War: West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Iceland.
Praise for the book
- "Brian Blankenship skillfully illustrates the dilemma that the United States faces in its pursuit of military burden-sharing with allies. By illuminating the tradeoff between control and cost-sharing, this book provides an important strategic perspective on debates over burden-sharing and broader alliance politics.” -- Tongfi Kim, Brussels School of Governance, author of The Supply Side of Security
- "In this persuasive and much-needed book, Blankenship highlights and explains variation in whether the United States brings burden-sharing pressure to bear on its allies and the extent to which those efforts succeed. The Burden-Sharing Dilemma is indispensable for understanding military alliances and American foreign policy." -- Alexander Lanoszka, University of Waterloo, author of Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century
- “An insightful study of the conditions under which US leaders seek increased support from allies and how allies respond. By focusing on bargaining among allies over time, Brian Blankenship helps us to understand the strengths and limits of the current US-led security order.” -- Brett Ashley Leeds, Rice University
- This richly researched book explains US decisions to exert allied burden-sharing pressure and when allies will actually comply with such pressure. Those interested in alliance politics, the political economy of security, and US foreign policy will find much to learn here." -- Paul Poast, University of Chicago, author of Arguing about Alliances
Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles
"Trivial Tripwires?: Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance." [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.] Security Studies 31 (1): 92-117 (2022). [Ungated]
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve, and test which types of measures are most reassuring using an original survey fielded on European foreign policy experts and a case study of U.S. and NATO reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that high-resolve but low-capability signals like tripwire forces in allied territory are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability but low-resolve signals like forces stationed offshore. Our study casts doubt on the reassurance value of tripwires and contributes to scholarship on interstate signaling.
"The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure." Security Studies 30 (5): 691-724 (2021). [Ungated]
Abstract: Existing scholarship on alliance burden-sharing focuses on explaining why smaller allies often under-contribute relative to their larger partners. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by great power pressure in shaping burden-sharing outcomes. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding, allies’ defense efforts are often a response to their patron’s threat of abandonment. When a patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to elicit burden-sharing. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in U.S. alliances from 1950-2010. The results show that allies exhibit higher levels of burden-sharing efforts when they are geographically vulnerable to attack, while allies exhibit lower levels of burden-sharing when they are in geostrategically valuable locations to the United States.
"Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?" [With Raymond Kuo.] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 66 (1): 3-31 (2022).
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most notable demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 8.9 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim that formal military alliances mediate the effect of JMEs. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership’s overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1973 through 2003. We find that JMEs in general do not escalate conflict, and that JMEs conducted with allies in particular reduce the probability of conflict escalation.
"Perceptions and Acceptability of Electricity Theft: Towards Better Public Service Provision." [With Jason Chun Yu Wong, Johannes Urpelainen, Karthik Ganesan, Kapardhi Bharadwaj, and Kanika Balani.] World Development 140: 105301 (2021).
Abstract: In many developing countries, theft remains a significant obstacle to ensuring proper public service provision and access. We argue that social acceptability of theft constitutes an understudied barrier to curbing power theft. Using a conjoint experiment, we study perceptions of theft in the form of using illegal wires, katiya, among rural and urban households in Uttar Pradesh, India (n = 1800). Social acceptability of theft is influenced by the income and electricity supply quality contexts of offenders. For a 1000-rupee (approx. 15 USD) income difference between hypothetical vignette agents, the odds of choosing a higher acceptability rating for an offender increases by 11%. One fewer hour of electricity supply received by the vignette person would increase the acceptability of their theft activity by 4%. The majority of respondents chose a warning as the appropriate punishment severity; income and supply quality distinguish the odds of choosing higher punishment categories. While there exists a sense of social reprimand for stealing power, desired punishment is nuanced and context-dependent.
"Promises under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in U.S. Alliances." International Studies Quarterly 64 (4): 1017-1030 (2020).
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany from 1961-1974. The findings have implications for understanding how states manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah M. Joyce] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (2): 545-573 (2020).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide economic benefits for strategic ends. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new data set of US government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. We illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code US military access in Africa, assess the relationship between spending and economic growth, and test whether economic inducements can buy influence.
"Barking Up the Wrong Tree: How Political Alignment Shapes Electoral Backlash from Natural Disasters." [With Ryan Kennedy, Johannes Urpelainen, and Joonseok Yang.] Comparative Political Studies 54 (7): 1163-1196 (2020).
Abstract: While scholarship on “retrospective voting” has found that incumbent politicians can be punished for a range of events outside their control, the literature has paid scant attention to the role of political alignment between the different levels of government in disaster responses and its implications for voting decisions. We argue that retrospective voters punish only opposition incumbents (candidates in office but not aligned with the government leader), who have limited access to government resources for relief, for natural disasters. We use monthly data on precipitation and evaporation to capture droughts and floods in India’s four thousand State Assembly electoral constituencies over the years 1977–2007. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Members of State Assembly from the party of the Prime or Chief Minister do not face an electoral backlash under bad weather conditions during the monsoon season, whereas opposition politicians face major losses.
"Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?" [With Benjamin Denison.] Survival 64 (5): 43-64 (2019).
Abstract: Using the framework of internal and external balancing, we assess the ability of the U.S. to pivot to great power competition with China and Russia. Based on current policy and long-term structural trends, we argue that the United States will be hard-pressed to find success in its efforts at great power competition. Specifically, we argue that fiscal trends in the United States have made it difficult for Washington to invest in sources of national power that would be facilitate efforts toward great power competition. Moreover, the Trump administration’s coercive approach to alliance burden-sharing is only likely to encourage U.S. allies to either go their own way or to hedge by accommodating Russia or China. Ultimately, we make the case that the United States would be well-served by either taking the politically difficult steps to overcome these constraints, or by moderating its grand strategy.
"When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 381-409 (2018).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve, and test which types of measures are most reassuring using an original survey fielded on European foreign policy experts and a case study of U.S. and NATO reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that high-resolve but low-capability signals like tripwire forces in allied territory are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability but low-resolve signals like forces stationed offshore. Our study casts doubt on the reassurance value of tripwires and contributes to scholarship on interstate signaling.
- Correspondence: "Tripwires and Alliance Reassurance: An Exchange," Security Studies 31 (4): 750-756. [With Erik Lin-Greenberg, Oriana Mastro, James Goldgeier, and Lily Wojtowicz.]
"The Price of Protection: Explaining Success and Failure of U.S. Alliance Burden-Sharing Pressure." Security Studies 30 (5): 691-724 (2021). [Ungated]
Abstract: Existing scholarship on alliance burden-sharing focuses on explaining why smaller allies often under-contribute relative to their larger partners. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by great power pressure in shaping burden-sharing outcomes. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding, allies’ defense efforts are often a response to their patron’s threat of abandonment. When a patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to elicit burden-sharing. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in U.S. alliances from 1950-2010. The results show that allies exhibit higher levels of burden-sharing efforts when they are geographically vulnerable to attack, while allies exhibit lower levels of burden-sharing when they are in geostrategically valuable locations to the United States.
"Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?" [With Raymond Kuo.] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 66 (1): 3-31 (2022).
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most notable demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 8.9 days. But it has often been argued that joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of war. Using a relational contracting approach, we claim that formal military alliances mediate the effect of JMEs. Exercises and alliances serve complementary functions: The former allows targeted responses to military provocations by adversaries, while the latter provides institutional constraints on partners and establishes a partnership’s overall strategic limitations. In combination, alliances dampen the conflict escalation effects of exercises, deterring adversaries while simultaneously restraining partners. We test this theory using a two-stage model on directed dyadic data of JMEs from 1973 through 2003. We find that JMEs in general do not escalate conflict, and that JMEs conducted with allies in particular reduce the probability of conflict escalation.
"Perceptions and Acceptability of Electricity Theft: Towards Better Public Service Provision." [With Jason Chun Yu Wong, Johannes Urpelainen, Karthik Ganesan, Kapardhi Bharadwaj, and Kanika Balani.] World Development 140: 105301 (2021).
Abstract: In many developing countries, theft remains a significant obstacle to ensuring proper public service provision and access. We argue that social acceptability of theft constitutes an understudied barrier to curbing power theft. Using a conjoint experiment, we study perceptions of theft in the form of using illegal wires, katiya, among rural and urban households in Uttar Pradesh, India (n = 1800). Social acceptability of theft is influenced by the income and electricity supply quality contexts of offenders. For a 1000-rupee (approx. 15 USD) income difference between hypothetical vignette agents, the odds of choosing a higher acceptability rating for an offender increases by 11%. One fewer hour of electricity supply received by the vignette person would increase the acceptability of their theft activity by 4%. The majority of respondents chose a warning as the appropriate punishment severity; income and supply quality distinguish the odds of choosing higher punishment categories. While there exists a sense of social reprimand for stealing power, desired punishment is nuanced and context-dependent.
"Promises under Pressure: Statements of Reassurance in U.S. Alliances." International Studies Quarterly 64 (4): 1017-1030 (2020).
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany from 1961-1974. The findings have implications for understanding how states manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah M. Joyce] The Journal of Conflict Resolution 64 (2): 545-573 (2020).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide economic benefits for strategic ends. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new data set of US government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. We illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code US military access in Africa, assess the relationship between spending and economic growth, and test whether economic inducements can buy influence.
"Barking Up the Wrong Tree: How Political Alignment Shapes Electoral Backlash from Natural Disasters." [With Ryan Kennedy, Johannes Urpelainen, and Joonseok Yang.] Comparative Political Studies 54 (7): 1163-1196 (2020).
Abstract: While scholarship on “retrospective voting” has found that incumbent politicians can be punished for a range of events outside their control, the literature has paid scant attention to the role of political alignment between the different levels of government in disaster responses and its implications for voting decisions. We argue that retrospective voters punish only opposition incumbents (candidates in office but not aligned with the government leader), who have limited access to government resources for relief, for natural disasters. We use monthly data on precipitation and evaporation to capture droughts and floods in India’s four thousand State Assembly electoral constituencies over the years 1977–2007. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Members of State Assembly from the party of the Prime or Chief Minister do not face an electoral backlash under bad weather conditions during the monsoon season, whereas opposition politicians face major losses.
"Is America Prepared for Great-Power Competition?" [With Benjamin Denison.] Survival 64 (5): 43-64 (2019).
Abstract: Using the framework of internal and external balancing, we assess the ability of the U.S. to pivot to great power competition with China and Russia. Based on current policy and long-term structural trends, we argue that the United States will be hard-pressed to find success in its efforts at great power competition. Specifically, we argue that fiscal trends in the United States have made it difficult for Washington to invest in sources of national power that would be facilitate efforts toward great power competition. Moreover, the Trump administration’s coercive approach to alliance burden-sharing is only likely to encourage U.S. allies to either go their own way or to hedge by accommodating Russia or China. Ultimately, we make the case that the United States would be well-served by either taking the politically difficult steps to overcome these constraints, or by moderating its grand strategy.
"When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 381-409 (2018).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Works in Progress
"Do Public Threats or Shaming Motivate Increased Burden-Sharing? Evidence from U.S. Alliances."
Abstract: Existing literature suggests that states in alliances can use their partners' abandonment fears to obtain favorable concessions for themselves. But evidence on the effectiveness of threats of abandonment as motivation for defense burden-sharing remains limited. This article uses a survey experiment conducted in Poland and Germany to assess how American signals of support and threats of abandonment shape public support for increasing their countries' military spending. The findings suggest that threats of abandonment increase public support for higher defense spending, whereas other approaches like ``naming and shaming'' under-contributing partners do not. However, threats are most effective when they are paired with assurances of protection if the target country complies and when they do not fundamentally undermine targets' confidence in U.S. protection. The findings have implications for scholars' understanding of alliance politics and the utility of public pressure, as well as for policy debates about effective levers for encouraging defense burden-sharing.
"Market for Access: Competition, Prospects for Power Projection, and the Costs of Foreign Bases." [With Renanah M. Joyce.]
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which states exert influence. Conventional wisdom holds that states pay more for foreign bases in the presence of third-party competitors, yet the mechanisms by which competition shapes the costs of bases are both theoretically underspecified and empirically understudied. This article tests three mechanisms by which competition can shape the price of access—denial, crowding out, and information—by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on US compensation and bases and qualitative evidence from the US presence in Djibouti. The findings suggest that China’s economic incentives may have crowded out the effectiveness of US economic incentives, while Djiboutian leaders escalated their demands for US compensation as other base-seekers entered the market due to a combination of direct efforts by US and rivals’ efforts to limit each other’s access and Djibouti’s learning about the value of its real estate.
Abstract: Existing literature suggests that states in alliances can use their partners' abandonment fears to obtain favorable concessions for themselves. But evidence on the effectiveness of threats of abandonment as motivation for defense burden-sharing remains limited. This article uses a survey experiment conducted in Poland and Germany to assess how American signals of support and threats of abandonment shape public support for increasing their countries' military spending. The findings suggest that threats of abandonment increase public support for higher defense spending, whereas other approaches like ``naming and shaming'' under-contributing partners do not. However, threats are most effective when they are paired with assurances of protection if the target country complies and when they do not fundamentally undermine targets' confidence in U.S. protection. The findings have implications for scholars' understanding of alliance politics and the utility of public pressure, as well as for policy debates about effective levers for encouraging defense burden-sharing.
"Market for Access: Competition, Prospects for Power Projection, and the Costs of Foreign Bases." [With Renanah M. Joyce.]
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which states exert influence. Conventional wisdom holds that states pay more for foreign bases in the presence of third-party competitors, yet the mechanisms by which competition shapes the costs of bases are both theoretically underspecified and empirically understudied. This article tests three mechanisms by which competition can shape the price of access—denial, crowding out, and information—by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on US compensation and bases and qualitative evidence from the US presence in Djibouti. The findings suggest that China’s economic incentives may have crowded out the effectiveness of US economic incentives, while Djiboutian leaders escalated their demands for US compensation as other base-seekers entered the market due to a combination of direct efforts by US and rivals’ efforts to limit each other’s access and Djibouti’s learning about the value of its real estate.
Other Publications
"Biden’s in Europe to reassure nervous allies. When does reassurance work?" Washington Post Monkey Cage, June 11, 2021.
"Biden wants to reassure allies that the U.S. is still interested in their security." Washington Post Monkey Cage, March 4, 2021.
"Access Denied? The Future of U.S. Basing in a Contested World." War on the Rocks, February 1, 2021. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Does the Pentagon's Checkbook Diplomacy Actually Work?" Defense One, June 23, 2020. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"'Money as a Weapons System': The Promises and Pitfalls of Foreign Defense Contracting." Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 892, June 3, 2020. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Rethinking Reassurance." Political Violence at a Glance, November 13, 2018. [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
"Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO." War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Biden wants to reassure allies that the U.S. is still interested in their security." Washington Post Monkey Cage, March 4, 2021.
"Access Denied? The Future of U.S. Basing in a Contested World." War on the Rocks, February 1, 2021. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Does the Pentagon's Checkbook Diplomacy Actually Work?" Defense One, June 23, 2020. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"'Money as a Weapons System': The Promises and Pitfalls of Foreign Defense Contracting." Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 892, June 3, 2020. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Rethinking Reassurance." Political Violence at a Glance, November 13, 2018. [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.]
"Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO." War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Joyce.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Joyce.]