Publications and Works in Progress
Peer-Reviewed Publications
"When Do States Take the Bait? State Capacity and the Provocation Logic of Terrorism." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 62 (2): 381-409 (February 2018).
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah Miles] Revise and Resubmit at The Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide an economic boon. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new dataset of U.S. government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. Finally, we illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code U.S. military access in Africa, and demonstrate that U.S. access is by far the most powerful predictor of U.S. spending.
"How Do Sectoral Interests Shape Distributive Politics? Evidence from Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies." Accepted for publication at the Review of Policy Research. [With Johannes Urpelainen.]
Abstract: Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991-2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline-diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (April 2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Replication materials: Data Do-file
Abstract: A prominent theory holds that groups may use terrorism in order to provoke governments into undertaking repression that alienates the population. However, virtually no studies have addressed the central puzzle of this provocation logic: why states would actually fall into this trap, if doing so can backfire. This study seeks to address this puzzle by suggesting conditions under which states would respond to terrorism with repression. I argue that states with limited bureaucratic capacity are more prone to using repression after terrorist incidents, as their ability to selectively crack down is inhibited by their more limited capability for controlling, monitoring, and collecting revenue from their populations and for collecting intelligence on suspected terrorists. Using a cross-national analysis with data from 1981 to 2011, I find it is low-capacity states which are most likely to respond to terrorism with repression, while constraints on executive authority have no clear effect.
"Purchasing Power: U.S. Overseas Defense Spending and Military Statecraft." [With Renanah Miles] Revise and Resubmit at The Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Abstract: The literature on economic statecraft has long focused on the effectiveness of foreign aid and trade as tools of inducement. However, existing scholarship largely neglects the role played by government procurement. By choosing to purchase goods or hire labor in foreign states, governments can provide an economic boon. The United States in particular leverages its defense procurement as a foreign policy tool. We introduce a new dataset of U.S. government procurement using information on all contracts executed overseas from 2000 to 2015. We develop a typology of how states use procurement to achieve foreign policy goals—power projection, counterinsurgency, and development—and provide descriptive statistics to explore variation in spending across countries and over time. Finally, we illustrate the power of the contract data by using it to code U.S. military access in Africa, and demonstrate that U.S. access is by far the most powerful predictor of U.S. spending.
"How Do Sectoral Interests Shape Distributive Politics? Evidence from Gasoline and Diesel Subsidies." Accepted for publication at the Review of Policy Research. [With Johannes Urpelainen.]
Abstract: Sectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991-2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline-diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.
"A Deceptive Estimate? The Politics of Irregular Troop Numbers in Vietnam." Journal of Intelligence History 12 (2): 93-112 (April 2013).
Abstract: Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms has received a great deal of criticism for his role in the conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US military over Communist strength in the Vietnam War. Specifically, he has been charged with ordering his subordinates to “cave” into accepting the military's lower numbers for political reasons. However, the evidence casts doubt on the claim that it was his influence that forced an end to the debate – and on the notion that he could or should have pushed the higher numbers through. Moreover, an analysis of the stakes involved in the “numbers game” reveals much about the interested parties' perceptions of the war itself, ultimately bringing into question the possibility that one can “know one's enemy” without first understanding him, and suggesting that any attempt to fight a war without doing so is inevitably self-delusive.
Works in Progress
"Promises under Pressure: Reassurance in Asymmetric Alliances."
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have the patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany. The findings have implications for understanding alliance bargaining and design, and suggest a new pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Market for Access: Competition, Need, and the Prospects for Power Projection," [With Renanah Miles.]
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which great powers exert influence in international politics. Yet variation in the costs of securing military access--a requisite for power projection--remains understudied. We argue that bargaining outcomes are shaped by a market for access in which price is determined by supply and demand. Hosts, or ``sellers,'' extract higher compensation for access when there are multiple potential ``buyers,'' or when the sending state has a high need for access. By contrast, when there are many potential sellers or the seller has greater need for a deal, the buying state can secure more advantageous terms. We test these propositions by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on U.S. governmental spending and access in Africa from 2000 to 2015. To trace the causal mechanisms, we conduct a case study of great power bargaining for access in Djibouti during the same period. Our findings have implications for scholarly understanding of how other powers can impose costs on dominant states. We find that third-party competitors can pose problems by simply acting as alternative suppliers of desired goods to states in contested areas--even in a unipolar era where the United States is the sole superpower.
"The Patron's Price: Understanding Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing."
Abstract: Much of the existing scholarship on burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances explains why smaller allies under-contribute to the alliance. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by coercive bargaining. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding or the pursuit of private goods, allies' defense efforts are often a response to to their patron's bargaining leverage. When the patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to extract burden-sharing. In particular, when the patron perceives a higher level of threat, this reduces the credibility of its threats by making its allies more valuable. By contrast, the costs of patron abandonment are greater for allies which perceive higher levels of threat. Second, when the patron faces resource constraints due to costly foreign wars or economic crises, its threat of abandonment becomes inherently more credible. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in American alliances since 1950. Additionally, I conduct case studies on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea bargaining during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as burden-sharing by Poland and the Baltic states in the 2000s and 2010s.
"Revolutions in Reassurance: How Technological Innovation Alters Alliance Assurances." [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.],
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? The United States has invested billions in exercises and foreign military presence in Europe and Asia aimed at reassuring its partners of its willingness and ability to protect them from a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and an erratic North Korea. Yet the effectiveness of these reassurance signals is uncertain. Existing literature on security guarantees largely focuses on the effectiveness of deterring adversaries, but partners’ perceptions of signals of commitment remain underexplored. We introduce a typology of reassurance measures which disentangles the mechanisms by which foreign-deployed military forces increase allies’ confidence in U.S. protection by separating out signals that reassure allies of U.S. resolve and signals that reassure allies of U.S. capability. We classify reassurance measures as either tripwires, shields, offshore, or drive-bys and demonstrations. We test our propositions using a mixed method approach that combines rich qualitative case studies informed by interviews with government officials and analysis of government materials with a novel comparative survey experiment fielded in the Baltics and the United States. Our findings will contribute to the academic literature on the credibility of threats and promises by identifying which signals have the greatest reassurance effect. Further, the results can help inform policy decisions on alliances by exploring not only what reassures, but also whether lower-cost alternatives to large overseas presence can be equally effective at reassuring allies.
"The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises." [With Raymond Kuo.],
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But when do they lead to interstate hostility and war? We argue that, by themselves, joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of conflict. However, alliances neutralize this effect by providing formal channels to constrain military adventurism by partners. Using a two-stage model on dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003, we find that states bound by: 1) an alliance pact; 2) an alliance with high levels of institutionalization; and 3) an alliance with conditional obligations are indeed more likely to conduct JMEs. Additionally, after isolating the effect of JMEs, we find that they increase the risk of war, but not when conducted by allies.
Abstract: Great powers frequently reassure allies of their protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of alliance reassurance are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, reassurance is puzzling because it invites allies to free-ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have the patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that patrons use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons thus face a dilemma wherein they trade off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of U.S. reassurance from 1950-2010, as well as qualitative evidence from U.S. reassurance toward West Germany. The findings have implications for understanding alliance bargaining and design, and suggest a new pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers' foreign commitments.
"Market for Access: Competition, Need, and the Prospects for Power Projection," [With Renanah Miles.]
Abstract: Power projection is a central means by which great powers exert influence in international politics. Yet variation in the costs of securing military access--a requisite for power projection--remains understudied. We argue that bargaining outcomes are shaped by a market for access in which price is determined by supply and demand. Hosts, or ``sellers,'' extract higher compensation for access when there are multiple potential ``buyers,'' or when the sending state has a high need for access. By contrast, when there are many potential sellers or the seller has greater need for a deal, the buying state can secure more advantageous terms. We test these propositions by studying the behavior of the United States in Africa, using new data on U.S. governmental spending and access in Africa from 2000 to 2015. To trace the causal mechanisms, we conduct a case study of great power bargaining for access in Djibouti during the same period. Our findings have implications for scholarly understanding of how other powers can impose costs on dominant states. We find that third-party competitors can pose problems by simply acting as alternative suppliers of desired goods to states in contested areas--even in a unipolar era where the United States is the sole superpower.
"The Patron's Price: Understanding Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing."
Abstract: Much of the existing scholarship on burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances explains why smaller allies under-contribute to the alliance. However, the literature largely neglects the role played by coercive bargaining. I argue that rather than being a product of rational free-riding or the pursuit of private goods, allies' defense efforts are often a response to to their patron's bargaining leverage. When the patron can more credibly threaten to reduce its protection, and when doing so would impose serious costs on allies, it is better positioned to extract burden-sharing. In particular, when the patron perceives a higher level of threat, this reduces the credibility of its threats by making its allies more valuable. By contrast, the costs of patron abandonment are greater for allies which perceive higher levels of threat. Second, when the patron faces resource constraints due to costly foreign wars or economic crises, its threat of abandonment becomes inherently more credible. I test the theory using data on allied burden-sharing in American alliances since 1950. Additionally, I conduct case studies on U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea bargaining during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as burden-sharing by Poland and the Baltic states in the 2000s and 2010s.
"Revolutions in Reassurance: How Technological Innovation Alters Alliance Assurances." [With Erik Lin-Greenberg.],
Abstract: How can states most effectively reassure their allies? The United States has invested billions in exercises and foreign military presence in Europe and Asia aimed at reassuring its partners of its willingness and ability to protect them from a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and an erratic North Korea. Yet the effectiveness of these reassurance signals is uncertain. Existing literature on security guarantees largely focuses on the effectiveness of deterring adversaries, but partners’ perceptions of signals of commitment remain underexplored. We introduce a typology of reassurance measures which disentangles the mechanisms by which foreign-deployed military forces increase allies’ confidence in U.S. protection by separating out signals that reassure allies of U.S. resolve and signals that reassure allies of U.S. capability. We classify reassurance measures as either tripwires, shields, offshore, or drive-bys and demonstrations. We test our propositions using a mixed method approach that combines rich qualitative case studies informed by interviews with government officials and analysis of government materials with a novel comparative survey experiment fielded in the Baltics and the United States. Our findings will contribute to the academic literature on the credibility of threats and promises by identifying which signals have the greatest reassurance effect. Further, the results can help inform policy decisions on alliances by exploring not only what reassures, but also whether lower-cost alternatives to large overseas presence can be equally effective at reassuring allies.
"The Causes and Consequences of Joint Military Exercises." [With Raymond Kuo.],
Abstract: Multinational military exercises are among the most common demonstrations of military cooperation and intent. On average, one is initiated every 2.5 days. But when do they lead to interstate hostility and war? We argue that, by themselves, joint military exercises (JMEs) increase the risk of conflict. However, alliances neutralize this effect by providing formal channels to constrain military adventurism by partners. Using a two-stage model on dyadic data of JMEs from 1977 through 2003, we find that states bound by: 1) an alliance pact; 2) an alliance with high levels of institutionalization; and 3) an alliance with conditional obligations are indeed more likely to conduct JMEs. Additionally, after isolating the effect of JMEs, we find that they increase the risk of war, but not when conducted by allies.
Other Publications
"Control vs. Cost-Sharing: The Dilemma at the Heart of NATO." War on the Rocks, August 7, 2018.
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Miles.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare Blog, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Miles.]
Review of The Supply Side of Security by Tongfi Kim, Political Science Quarterly 132 (2): 360–361 (Summer 2017).
Review of Theory of Unipolar Politics by Nuno Monteiro, Political Science Quarterly 130 (1): 157-158 (Spring 2015).
"Can Obama Play the Trump Card With Allies?" War on the Rocks. August 15, 2016.
"The Risks of U.S. Allies Going Rogue." National Interest, January 22, 2016. [With Renanah Miles.]
"Djibouti's First, But Will It Last?" Lawfare Blog, January 3, 2016. [With Renanah Miles.]
Review of The Supply Side of Security by Tongfi Kim, Political Science Quarterly 132 (2): 360–361 (Summer 2017).
Review of Theory of Unipolar Politics by Nuno Monteiro, Political Science Quarterly 130 (1): 157-158 (Spring 2015).